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Exploring Constituency-Level Estimates for the 2017 British General 
Election 
 
Most opinion polls conducted during British general election campaigns report on each 
party’s estimated national vote share. Although of considerable interest, these data do not 
put the spotlight on the marginal seats, the constituencies targeted by the parties for 
intensive canvassing; these are where the contest for a majority in the House of Commons is 
won and lost. There have been some polls covering those constituencies as a whole, but very 
few of individual constituencies so there was very little reporting of the outcome for each 
party in those individual constituencies. That changed with the 2017 general election, when 
three analysts published estimates on the internet of each party’s vote share separately for 
each constituency and with those data predicted which party would win each seat. This 
paper explores the veracity of those estimates, finding that although in general terms they 
accurately represented the relative position of each constituency in the share of each party’s 
votes, nevertheless their estimates of which marginal seats would be won by each were not 
as accurate. The implications of such polls, especially as their predictive ability is improved, 
is discussed. 
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Opinion polling is a major feature of British parliamentary election campaigns. Despite some clear 
failures – to identify the winning party correctly let alone each party’s percentage of the votes (see 
Sturgis et al. 2016, 2017) – it is widely used by the print and broadcast media, often as their main 
stories, to chart a campaign’s progress as well as to assess the relative popularity of government and 
opposition throughout a parliament’s existence (on the polls generally, see the various chapters in 
Wring et al., 2017). Most of the reported polls relate to the national situation, but a major 
innovation during the 2017 general election campaign is a harbinger of a probable future 
development that could have a major impact in a number of ways. 
 
Although a national picture of each party’s vote share – at the time when the poll was taken and 
generally used as an indicator of the likely outcome on polling day – is presented by most polls, it is 
widely appreciated that, important though those shares are as representing each party’s standing, 
they are not necessarily a good indicator of the number of MPs it is likely to have returned to the 
House of Commons. Predicting the number of seats a party will get with a given share of the votes is 
difficult. The interaction of several different geographical factors – the spatial concentration of each 
party’s supporters and the placing of constituency boundaries, for example (Gudgin and Taylor, 
1979) – with a party’s number of votes received can have a major influence on how many seats are 
won. Most UK election results show both substantial disproportionality in the ratio of seats to votes 
and bias (see Table 1); with the latter, different parties get a different share of the seats even with 
the same vote share (Johnston et al., 2001). Further, because of those geographical factors a 
substantial number of constituencies is almost certain to be won by the strongest party there by a 
wide majority: the local result is foregone and, save a major inter-election shift in a party’s support, 
in many seats the national vote share is irrelevant. Elections are determined in a relatively small 
number of marginal seats, those – no more than about one-fifth of the total – won at the previous 
contest by only a modest majority and which could be lost with relatively small changes in two or 
more parties’ vote shares. 
 
 2 
 
Those marginal seats are the parties’ targets during election campaigns – and increasingly in the 
months and even years before an election is called and the official campaign commences. Parties 
now identify which constituencies to target well in advance of the election being called, candidates 
and their local organisations raise money to finance their efforts to mobilise support among their 
potential voters (Johnston and Pattie, 2014), and central party organisations focus much of their 
activity on the voters there – alongside the national campaigns promoting their policies. 
 
While knowing the national situation in likely vote shares is important to party morale and campaign 
strategy, therefore, tactically the situation in the marginal constituencies is of most interest to 
parties, especially in the final weeks and days of a campaign when every vote garnered in those 
locales can be crucial to whether the election is won not only there but also nationally. For this 
purpose traditional opinion polls are little more than a general guide to the local situation. This was 
the situation at all elections until relatively recently. Parties – especially well-organised local parties 
with substantial financial and, especially, human resources – conducted their own (usually face-to-
face) canvasses seeking to identify their potential supporters and then encouraged them to vote, but 
these were rarely comprehensive (parties tend to focus their canvassers in parts of a constituency 
where they know their potential supporters are concentrated) and unlikely to give a representative 
sample of the electorate. Many post-election ‘inquests’ involve candidates and their agents 
reporting that their ‘polling’ suggested they were winning, but when the votes were cast they had 
lost. 
 
In general, polling organisations – and even the parties’ own private polling – could not fill this 
lacuna in needed information, though some pollsters, usually with one or more media customers, 
conducted polls on a sample of voters across all marginal seats, but not individual constituencies. 
Until the twenty-first century most polling involved face-to-face questioning by interviewers, which 
was both time-consuming and expensive. Very few constituency parties could undertake large 
enough polls to get a clear picture of the local situation, and national parties could not afford a large 
number of polls across all – or even a significant proportion of – their target seats. There were some 
exceptions to this, largely involving the Conservative party. Before the 2005 general election, Lord 
Ashcroft – at different times the party’s Deputy Chairman and Treasurer – provided substantial 
funds to a small number of constituency parties in marginal seats on the basis of their campaigning 
business plans, and a few used the money to commission local polls (Johnston and Pattie, 2007). This 
scheme was expanded by him from within Conservative national headquarters in the years leading 
up to the 2010 election, and again some of the money was used for polling – though in a minority of 
seats only (Cutts et al., 2012). Before the 2015 election, however, he capitalised on recent 
developments in online polling – as a private enterprise independent of the party’s organisational 
structures – to conduct separate polls in a large number of marginal constituencies (Cowley and 
Kavanagh, 2015, 242-244; Goot, 2017), visiting some of them on more than one occasion: the results 
– covering 167 constituencies in total – were all published on the web and subsequent research 
showed that the information provided had a significant impact on the intensity of local campaigns in 
the seats that were polled (Hartman et al., 2017; Barwell, 2016). 
 
A major shift took place with the 2017 election. By then, many polling organisations were collecting 
their information not through face-to-face interviews with a sample of voters selected to provide a 
nationally representative picture but rather through internet questionnaire instruments directed to 
a sample of volunteers registered with them as willing respondents. These were not representative 
samples of the national electorate, but various weighting mechanisms were deployed to provide an 
approximate representation of the national vote shares. This procedure had several major 
advantages over the traditional polling methods – both those involving face-to-face interviews and 
those with respondents questioned in telephone conversations. It was relatively cheap; large 
numbers of respondents could be polled in a short period; and because the data were collected 
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electronically they could be rapidly processed and reported. Results could be released and published 
within a day of the data being collected, allowing up-to-date estimates of the state of the parties as 
a campaign proceeded. 
 
For the 2017 election YouGov – a pioneer of online polling – decided to realise the potential of the 
large amount of data they were collecting (they were polling at least daily) to produce estimates of 
the likely outcome in each constituency; Lord Ashcroft did the same. By combining recent polling 
data, they had a substantial amount of information from respondents in most, if not all, 
constituencies. These were not representative samples of each constituency’s electorate, but 
experimentation showed that by combining them with other available data, such as the constituency 
result at the last election (full details of the methodologies are given below), they could produce 
reasonable estimates of each party’s likely vote share – and thus of the likely winner – in each seat. 
Further, as more polling data were obtained those estimates could be updated, allowing them to 
provide current estimates not only of vote shares but also of the number of seats each party would 
probably win, rather than those derived from one survey at a particular date. Alongside them, a 
third set of estimates was produced by an academic – Chris Hanretty: he lacked access to the wealth 
of contemporary polling data available to the other two, but developed a methodology combining 
available individual-level data (e.g. from the British Election Study) with a range of other material to 
produce a further set of estimates for each constituency. 
 
These developments – combining large amounts of polling and other data to produce readily-
accessible, freely-available estimates of the likely outcome in each constituency – have considerable 
potential value, for the media, the parties and their local organisations, and the voters. So how 
accurate were they? Did they provide reasonable estimates of the outcome by constituency in 2017? 
This paper presents the results of addressing those questions through analyses of the three sets of 
estimates compared with the actual outcome. 
 
The Three Methods 
 
Forecasting election outcomes is exceptionally difficult in the UK because of its large number of 
parliamentary constituencies and First Past the Post (i.e., ‘winner take all’) electoral system. Most 
pollsters assess vote intentions among likely voters at the national level to determine which party 
leads the race. Sample sizes for pre-election surveys typically contact between 1-2,000 respondents,1 
allowing pollsters to strike an acceptable balance between minimizing sampling error (ca. 3% - 
though see below) while managing the recruitment costs. Given that there were 650 parliamentary 
constituencies in the UK at the 2017 General Election, most polls would include fewer than five 
respondents from each constituency; with such minimal information, it is impossible for them to 
reliably estimate constituency-level vote shares. 
 
That problem of small subsamples could be tackled by drastically increasing the number of 
respondents. Before the 2017 election, for example, YouGov polled approximately 7,000 
respondents daily—nearly 50,000 per week right up to the eve of the election—about their voting 
intentions,2 and Lord Ashcroft used responses from about 40,000 individuals per week to feed into 
his seat projections.3 While a sample of 40-50,000 respondents has a very small margin of sampling 
error nationally (ca. 1%), the constituency-level subsamples average 60-80, which corresponds to 
considerably higher degrees of uncertainty (ca. 12%). Even with these large weekly polls, therefore, 
                                                          
1 Polling data are available at UK Polling Report: ukpollingreport.co.uk. 
2 Details about the YouGov polling and modelling are available at their website: https://yougov.co.uk/news/ 
2017/05/31/how-yougov-model-2017-general-election-works/ 
3 Details about the Ashcroft polling and modelling are available at his website: http://lordashcroftpolls.com 
/2017/05/election-2017-ashcroft-model/ 
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it would take months to accumulate a sufficiently large sample to directly generate reliable 
constituency-level vote intentions. The third of the analysts, Hanretty, was not associated with such 
large-scale daily polling and relied upon data from the 2014-2018 British Election Study Internet 
Panel (which coincidentally was undertaken by YouGov) combined with all publicly released national 
pre-election polls to increase the proportion of respondents in each constituency.4  
 
To correct for the high degree of uncertainty due to small subsamples at the constituency scale, 
YouGov, Ashcroft, and Hanretty all used a statistical method called Multilevel Regression and Post-
stratification (MRP), or ‘Mister P’ as it is affectionately known by its users (Gelman and Little, 1997; 
Ghitza and Gelman, 2013; Park et al., 2004).5 MRP works by combining known geographic and 
demographic proportions (e.g., age, gender, education, race, and ethnicity) from the UK Census in 
each constituency, plus the result in each constituency at the previous election, with individual 
polling responses (Hanretty et al., 2016).6 This allows forecasters to match the vote intentions of 
different geo-demographic profiles to the proportion of people for each profile in a given 
constituency. Constituency-level estimates are thus improved by partially pooling the subsamples 
with aggregate data from the survey itself, which is known as global smoothing, plus contextual 
information (e.g., past election outcomes, demographics, population, etc.: Hanretty et al., 2016). The 
higher the R2 between the constituency-level predictors and true vote shares, the more the 
estimates produced from MRP will improve. 
 
Despite the sophisticated methodology, one major concern of the approach adopted by all three 
analysts relates to the polling data deployed in their models. Most UK pollsters now recruit potential 
respondents via self-selected internet panels or other non-probability methods; their ‘samples’ are 
not drawn from the population with equal or known probabilities of selection, which makes it 
impossible to know for certain whether a given sample will reflect the views of the larger population, 
regardless of whether post-stratification weights are applied to adjust the final estimates. A task 
force on online panels for the American Association of Public Opinion Research cautions that 
pollsters ‘should avoid nonprobability online panels when one of the research objectives is to 
accurately estimate population values’ (AAPOR, 2010, 5), as these can be unrepresentative of the 
electorate as a whole; and the British Polling Council’s inquiry into the industry’s 2015 failings raised 
similar concerns (Sturgis et al., 2016, 2017) – which undoubtedly accounts for the very different 
constituency-level estimates produced by the three analysts and explored here.  
 
MRP therefore uses local estimates derived from aggregate level survey data—regardless of whether 
they are representative of the local population—combined with constituency level covariates; this 
delivers a partial pooling approach designed to provide more accurate constituency estimates of 
each party’s vote share than the relatively small sub-sample sizes would otherwise generate 
(Gelman et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2015).  The approach’s main disadvantage, however, is that it 
assumes that the demographics in the surveys matched to contextual covariates are predictive of 
that particular subgroup whereas if the individuals in the survey have different latent attitudes than 
is the case for the (local) population which they have been selected to represent, then the 
constituency-level estimates can be biased. In general, MRP will provide far better estimates than 
naïve models, but it is not a panacea to the shrinking response rates that pollsters have recently 
experienced and their consequential growing reliance on self-selected Internet panels. Furthermore, 
                                                          
4 Details about the Hanretty model are available at his website: http://electionforecast.co.uk/ 
5 Andrew Gelman refers to the MRP method as ‘secret sauce’ at his website: http://andrewgelman.com 
/2013/10/09/mister-p-whats-its-secret-sauce/ 
6 The approach has been used in the health field to predict local behaviours based on combining information 
from individual surveys and census data about small areas (Twigg et al., 2000); it has been found to work well 
for some outcomes but not others (e.g., good at cigarette consumption but not so good at alcohol 
consumption).  
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as Buttice and Highton (2013) demonstrate, MRP can produce wildly different results depending on 
several factors (e.g., the degree to which geographic covariates actually explain variation on the 
outcome of interest, the ratio of opinion variation across geographic units relative to opinion 
variation within units, etc.). Because these things are unknown and unknowable, it is difficult to 
assess the accuracy of these models prior to the event in question. The remainder of this paper thus 
assesses the performance of the three sets of estimates against the 2017 result to gain some insight 
into their long-term potential value. 
 
The Baseline 
 
A generally-accepted feature of British general elections is that the national changes between 
contests in support for each party – especially the two largest that have dominated British politics 
since 1945 – are reflected in each constituency. The geography of each party’s support is relatively 
consistent in its topography – the highs and lows are the same at each contest – and the main inter-
election change is in that topography’s elevation. A party whose vote share increases nationally 
between two elections tends to enjoy a comparable experience – with some relatively minor 
variation – in each constituency, a pattern brought to wide attention by David Butler’s introduction 
of the concept of uniform swing (e.g., see Butler and Stokes, 1974; for a comprehensive review see 
Butler and Van Beek, 1990) and his refinement of the ‘swingometer’ (invented by Peter Milne for the 
1955 general election7) has been used in media presentations (especially by the BBC) in election 
night broadcasts, plus other discussions of the changing geography of party support. 
 
Given that general pattern, it is relatively straightforward to predict the outcome across the 
constituencies at one election from the result at the previous contest with considerable accuracy – 
assuming that constituency boundaries were not redrawn in the interim. Such a prediction forms the 
baseline for the current exploration; if the poll-based estimates are of value, they should predict the 
outcome better than the result of the previous contest because they are able to identify variations 
from the uniform swing and point to the constituencies where a relatively-unanticipated shift is 
occurring. That baseline is presented here, with separate analyses for England and Wales and for 
Scotland, reflecting the very different party composition of votes cast in the latter compared to the 
former in both 2015 and 2017. (The analysts did not provide estimates for Northern Ireland’s 
eighteen constituencies.) For England and Wales the focus is on support for the Conservative and 
Labour parties, who dominated the 2017 outcome with 87 per cent of the votes cast there, winning 
559 of the 573 seats, though the results for the Liberal Democrats are included; for Scotland, the 
performance of all four large parties is analysed. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of linear regressions for each party, with its 2017 vote share as the 
dependent variable and its 2015 share as the independent, across all constituencies in the relevant 
countries. The r2 values (the squared correlation coefficients indicating the proportion of the 
variation in the dependent variable accounted for by that in the independent) are all very high, 
indicating a very close fit – as illustrated in Figure 1 for the Conservative and Labour parties in 
England and Wales. Only one r2 value is less than 0.80 – for the SNP, which experienced not only a 
substantial loss of support between the two elections (as indicated by the relatively small b 
coefficient in the regression equation) but also considerable geographical variation in that decline – 
as illustrated by Figure 2. 
 
For the great majority of constituencies in all three countries the result in 2017 could have been 
readily predicted from the outcome two years earlier, therefore. Could the analysts’ estimates for 
the later election outperform those predictions, especially for the constituencies lying some distance 
                                                          
7 For example, see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11511608/Meet-the-man-who-
invented-the-Swingometer.html. 
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from the regression lines (as in Figure 1) where a party’s performance was substantially better or 
worse in 2017 than in 2015? 
 
The Analysts’ Estimates 
 
England and Wales 
 
Table 3 reports regressions comparable to those in Table 2, except that the independent (predictor) 
variables are each of the three analysts’ predictions of the relevant party’s share of the votes cast in 
2017. In general, the r2 values indicate that they out-predicted the baseline models, although there 
are instances where this is not the case. For instance, Hanretty’s r2 was lower than the baseline 
models predicting the Conservatives and Labour performance (by 4 and 2 percentage points, 
respectively) than when the predictor variable was 2015 performance. 
 
An initial conclusion, therefore, is that the analysts’ methods were better at estimating each party’s 
performance across constituencies in England and Wales than was simple reliance on the result of 
the previous election, only two years earlier. It is probably more accurate to claim they were slightly 
better, however, in that the baseline models correctly predicted between 82 and 95 per cent of the 
variation in the 2017 outcome. Nevertheless, at first glance the analysts’ methods appear superior. 
 
A caveat to that conclusion is indicated by the graphs in Figure 3, however, which show each set of 
estimates for the Conservative and Labour performances against the actual outcomes. (On these 
graphs the diagonals are not regression lines; they indicate equality where the predicted and actual 
values should be the same.) Although in all six cases the points representing the individual 
constituencies are clustered along a diagonal trajectory indicative of a close fit to regression lines 
(those in Table 3), their positions relative to the line indicating equality between the two values raise 
some problems. With YouGov’s estimates, for example, there is a clear tendency for the 2017 
Conservative vote share to be under-estimated where that share is high (i.e., most of the points 
where the estimated value is 40 per cent or more are above the diagonal), whereas it is over-
estimated where the Conservative share is relatively small (i.e., most of the points where the 
estimated value is less than c.30 per cent are below the diagonal). A similar pattern is even clearer in 
the graph for Labour; its performance is under-estimated, substantially so in some constituencies, 
where it obtained half or more of the votes cast.8 
 
With Ashcroft’s estimates, the graph for the Conservatives shows that, although again there is a 
tight fit to a diagonal trajectory, in the great majority of constituencies the party’s performance was 
under-estimated – in almost every seat where the estimated percentage was less than 40. For 
Labour, on the other hand, apart from some constituencies where the actual percentages were 
below 20, the party’s performance was quite considerably under-estimated, especially where Labour 
won more than half of the votes. Hanretty’s estimates are more widely scattered around the 
equality diagonal line for the Conservatives (consistent with the lower r2 value for his estimates 
compared to the other two), but with an even division above and below that line. For Labour, on the 
other hand, like Ashcroft he considerably under-estimated Labour’s performance across virtually all 
constituencies.9 
                                                          
8 One probable reason why the Conservative and Labour vote shares are over-estimated in many 
constituencies is that polls – and especially internet polls based on non-representative samples – almost 
invariably under-estimate the number of non-voters. This may particularly be the case in safe seats where the 
incentive for less-committed voters to turn out is smaller than in marginal seats. 
9 One problem that analysts had to face in estimating the 2017 outcome relative to that in 2015 was not only 
the very substantial decline in support for UKIP between the two contests (it won 12.6 per cent of the votes at 
the first of those elections but only 1.8 per cent at the second). In general, the Conservatives were the main 
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Although, as the regression equations in Table 3 indicate, each set of estimates is closely related to 
the actual outcomes, therefore, inspection of the graphs suggests that while the ordering of the 
parties in terms of their relative vote shares is accurately predicted, the actual shares may not be. 
This can introduce problems of interpretation – particularly of which party is going to win each seat, 
to which we return in a later section. 
 
Scotland 
 
The 2017 election saw a considerable shift in support for two of the four parties compared to their 
2015 performance: the SNP’s vote share fell from 50 to 37 per cent while the Conservatives’ almost 
doubled from 15 to 29; Labour’s share increased slightly – from 24 to 27 per cent – and the Liberal 
Democrats’ fell by one point to 7. Given that volatility, how accurate were the analysts’ estimates of 
the result in each constituency? 
 
Table 4 indicates that they were comparable to their success rate in England for the Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, with all but one of the r2 values exceeding 0.85: YouGov 
performed best overall and Hanretty least well. But they were much less successful in estimating the 
SNP’s performance. That varied considerably across the 59 constituencies, with a mean decline in 
support of 13.1 percentage points and a standard deviation of 3.9 points; whereas the fall in support 
was less than 10 points in seventeen constituencies it was over 15 points in twenty-six others. The 
analysts’ models were clearly less able to handle such a substantial change and its spatial variability 
(see also Johnston et al., 2017). 
 
Which Seats Would Be Won and Lost? 
 
Although the analyses reported so far suggest considerable success for the analysts’ modelling, one 
aspect of their estimates – emphasised by the graphs in Figure 3 – raises queries regarding their 
utility. Although they can predict each party’s relative success in getting vote share in every 
constituency with considerable accuracy (though less so for the SNP) – i.e. they can put the 
constituencies in the right order – can they successfully predict which party will win each seat? Given 
that for most constituencies the winner is usually certain – Great Britain has relatively few marginal 
seats and their number has been declining recently (Curtice, 2015, 2018) – the real value of the 
estimating procedures will be whether they can successfully identify trends in the marginal seats 
where uncertainty regarding the outcome is the norm and canvassing most intense. 
 
Table 5 provides an overview of each analysts’ ‘success rate’. YouGov correctly estimated the 
winning party in 93.3 per cent of the 631 constituencies in Great Britain (the 632nd, Buckingham, 
which was being defended by the incumbent Speaker, is excluded) as did Ashcroft in 87.8 per cent 
and Hanretty in 85.6. Both Ashcroft and Hanretty were much less successful in predicting which 
seats would be won by Labour rather than the Conservatives than was YouGov; Ashcroft predicted 
that the Conservatives would win 355 seats, for example, as against their actual total of 317. 
 
Labour-Conservative Marginals in England and Wales 
 
To explore these predictions further, the three graphs in Figure 4 focus on the Labour-Conservative 
marginals in England and Wales, which Labour won or lost in 2015 by a margin of 10 percentage 
points or less: that margin is shown on the horizontal axis with the 2017 margin on the vertical axis. 
Each graph is divided into four quadrants: to the right of the zero point on the horizontal axis are the 
                                                          
beneficiaries of this collapse in UKIP support, especially in those seats where UKIP failed to field a candidate in 
2017 (it fielded 378 in 2017 compared to 558 two years earlier): see Johnston et al. (2018). 
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constituencies won by Labour in 2015, whereas to the left are those won by the Conservatives; 
above the zero point on the vertical axis are those won by Labour in 2017, whereas below it are 
those won by the Conservatives. The constituencies shown as red circles are those predicted to be 
won by Labour and which it won; the blue squares are those both predicted to be and actually won 
by the Conservatives: these two groups form the correct predictions. The green upward pointing 
triangles indicate constituencies Labour was predicted to win but lost to the Conservatives; and the 
orange downward-pointing triangles are seats that Labour won but the Conservatives were 
predicted to. 
 
There is a clear difference between the three analysts in their predictive ability in these crucial seats. 
Of the 85, YouGov correctly predicted which party would have the largest vote share in 68: in the 
upper-right quadrant it wrongly predicted only one constituency as a Conservative rather than a 
Labour victory, but in the lower-right it correctly identified only two of the five Labour-held seats 
captured by the Conservatives in 2017. In the lower-left quadrant it wrongly predicted that ten 
Conservative-held seats would switch to Labour, while correctly predicting that the Conservatives 
would retain the other twelve; and in the upper-left quadrant it wrongly predicted three very 
narrow Labour victories in Conservative-held seats but correctly identified the seventeen that would 
change hands. 
 
By contrast to YouGov’s relative success Ashcroft’s predictions were correct in only 53 constituencies 
and Hanretty’s in 42. In both cases this reflects their general under-prediction of Labour’s 2017 vote 
share in almost all constituencies. 
 
Who Would Win in Scotland? 
 
The substantial decline in the SNP’s support varied substantially across the 59 constituencies there, 
as did the increase in support for the other three parties. As such, prediction of which seats would 
change hands was likely to be difficult, unless the local polling data clearly identified the local trends 
there – a problem exacerbated by the closeness of the result in many constituencies:10 the SNP won 
in eight with a majority of less than one percentage point and by between one and five points in a 
further seven. 
 
The graphs in Figure 5 indicate the extent of the analysts’ relative failure. All three identified only 
one of the seven seats won by Labour – which in each case was the seat it won in 2015 and then 
held in 2017; none of its six gains were predicted. The Conservatives also won a single seat in 2015, 
but 13 in 2017: YouGov correctly predicted seven of them, Ashcroft five and Hanretty four. And the 
Liberal Democrats increased their tally from one to four: YouGov correctly predicted three of them 
(i.e. two of the gains); Hanretty only correctly predicted that the party would retain the seat won in 
2015; and Ashcroft got none of the four correct. The result, as the graphs show, was that each 
analyst substantially over-estimated the SNP’s seat total, by 12, 16 and 16 seats respectively. 
 
Probabilities 
 
Because each of the analysts’ procedures involves statistical modelling, their estimates of each 
party’s vote share have associated confidence intervals – from which they can also calculate the 
probability of a party winning each seat. YouGov showed those confidence intervals graphically on 
                                                          
10 It is likely that there was some tactical voting with those opposed to the SNP (and in particular its advocacy 
of another independence referendum) choosing to vote for that party among the other three – i.e. those 
supporting the union – with the best chance of victory in their constituency. Picking up such variations would 
probably be difficult with relatively small polling numbers in each constituency and/or unless the modelling 
included variables to cover the tactical situation. 
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its website,11 but didn’t show the probabilities. (These were provided to us by them, however.) 
Ashcroft didn’t publish the confidence intervals but did show the victory probabilities;12 Hanretty 
published both.13 
 
The probabilities of a party winning a seat provide a further, more nuanced, picture of how well the 
analysts predicted the outcome in individual constituencies. Figure 6 provides two examples of those 
probabilities, according to the predicted vote percentage for the relevant party in England and 
Wales. Each shows a clear relationship; the larger a party’s predicted vote share the larger the 
probability of it winning the seat. In the first example, in almost all constituencies where YouGov 
predicted that Labour would win 50 per cent of more of the votes it was not surprisingly shown as 
virtually certain to win the seat (i.e. a probability of 100). Between 40 and 50 per cent there was a 
very steep decline in the probabilities, and with less than 40 per cent the probabilities were 
extremely low. (In two of the exceptions, probabilities of c.40 and c.60 were assigned to seats that 
Labour did win; the other was a Plaid Cymru victory.) In the second example – Ashcroft’s predictions 
of Conservative victories – the decline in probabilities where the predicted vote share falls below 50 
per cent is slightly less steep than in the first example, but the general pattern is the same; among 
the few exceptions of a probability of a Conservative victory being assessed as greater than 20 are 
three of Plaid Cymru’s four victories and the Greens’ single success. 
 
Table 6 summarises the pattern of probabilities according to whether a party won or lost the seat. 
For the Conservatives there is a clear difference between YouGov and the other two analysts. 
Whereas in no seats for which YouGov gave a probability of a Conservative victory of over 75 was 
that seat won by another party, both Ashcroft and Hanretty predicted a Conservative victory with a 
probability of 75 or greater in seats that were lost. The corollary of this was that both Ashcroft and 
Hanretty had many more probabilities below 75 than YouGov in seats that Labour won – a 
consequence of the former pair both substantially under-estimating Labour’s performance in many 
seats (Figure 2). YouGov was also better at predicting Liberal Democrat victories than the other two; 
in addition, Ashcroft’s modelling allocated a probability of less than 40 to each of Plaid Cymru’s four 
victories. 
 
Each graph in Figure 6 shows that where the probabilities are between c.50 and c.80 there is 
considerable variation in whether the designated party won the seat or not, which again puts the 
focus on the marginal constituencies – the subject of Figure 7. Its three graphs concentrate on the 
Labour-Conservative marginals in England and Wales, showing each analyst’s probability of a Labour 
victory and the actual winner.14 Five Labour-held marginals were won by the Conservatives in 2017. 
YouGov gave each a lower probability of a Labour win than it did for a majority of those marginals, 
but it gave similar relatively low probabilities for eight other seats which Labour nevertheless won 
again. Consistent with their under-estimation of Labour’s performance across all constituencies, 
Ashcroft and Hanretty produced few high probabilities of Labour winning again in marginal seats 
that they held in 2015. Ashcroft gave lower probabilities of Labour victories in four of the five seats 
that were captured by the Conservatives in 2017, suggesting that his polling and modelling picked up 
the substantial anti-Labour shifts there. Hanretty, on the other hand, did not; he gave lower 
probabilities of a Labour victory to several other seats – most of them won by Labour in 2015 by 
smaller margins than was the case in the seats lost to the Conservatives.  
                                                          
11 See, for example, https://yougov.co.uk/uk-general-election-2017/ (accessed 9 November 2017) 
12 https://dashboards.lordashcroftpolls.com/Storyboard/RHViewStoryBoard.aspx?RId=%c2%b2&RLId 
=%c2%b2&PId=%c2%b1%c2%b4%c2%bb%c2%b5%c2%b6&UId=%c2%b4%c2%b9%c2%b9%c2%b9%c2%bc&RpI
d=2 (accessed 9 November 2017) 
13 http://electionforecast.co.uk/ (accessed 9 November 2017) 
14 In almost every case, the probability of a Conservative victory in each of those seats according to all three 
analysts was (100 – Labour probability). 
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Turning to the Conservative-held marginals (to the left of the vertical lines in the graphs), YouGov 
clearly identified most of those where the Conservatives won again in 2017 – the probability of a 
Labour victory being less than 40 in many cases, with Labour winning none of those with such low 
odds. Most of those given high probabilities of Labour success were captured from the 
Conservatives, but of the ten seats for which the probability of Labour winning was between 60 and 
80, five were retained by the Conservatives and five lost. Ashcroft gave a probability of a Labour 
success of more than 40 in very few, and of 60 or more in none – all of those with a probability of 45 
or greater were Labour victories. Those to which he gave low probabilities (less than 20) were mostly 
retained by the Conservatives, but for constituencies with probabilities in the middle range (20-40 in 
this case), as with YouGov, as many were retained by the Conservatives as were lost to Labour. With 
very few exceptions, all of Hanretty’s probabilities for these seats were less than 20 – most of those 
seats in the exceptional category were lost to Labour – and there was no distinction between the 
seats that the Conservatives retained or lost. 
 
Figure 8 shows all 59 Scottish constituencies according to the SNP’s performance in 2015 plus each 
analyst’s estimated probability of it winning there again in 2017. The SNP retained most of the seats 
where it gained a majority of the votes in 2015 – i.e. those to the right of the 50 per cent vertical line 
on the graphs. All three analysts accurately predicted which seats the SNP would very likely lose: no 
seat given a probability of an SNP victory of 40 or less was retained; and all of the seats that the SNP 
retained, having won them with between 40 and 50 per cent of the votes in 2015, were given 
relatively high probabilities. Ashcroft and Hanretty were somewhat more successful than YouGov in 
assigning slightly smaller probabilities of the SNP losing seats to either the Conservatives or Labour.15 
 
Conclusions 
 
These first exercises in predicting the likely outcome in each constituency at a British general 
election were, not surprisingly, mixed in their success. Their goal was to combine data on the 
outcome in each place at the previous election with, suitably modified, contemporary polling and 
other data to identify local trends in support for the parties, from which they could derive estimates 
of the likely winner. In aggregate, they demonstrated considerable success, getting the overall 
pattern right, although in some cases either over- or under-predicting one or more party’s 
performance – either across all constituencies or in a substantial portion of them. But when the 
focus is on the marginal constituencies, where elections are won and lost, the picture is rather more 
mixed. In England and Wales some local trends, of constituencies that deviated from the national 
pattern of change, were correctly identified, but others were not. In Scotland, where there was a 
large drop in support for the largest party, to the benefit of different opponents depending on the 
local situation, identifying those local variations was difficult. 
 
Some of the reasons for those difficulties are clear. For example, Hanretty’s under-prediction of 
Labour’s performance in most constituencies undoubtedly reflects the lack of contemporary polling 
data that would have identified the swing to the party in the campaign’s final weeks. Ashcroft also 
under-predicted Labour’s performance in most constituencies, which may reflect either or both of 
the ability of his polls to pick up the late swing to Labour and insufficient weight being given to the 
most recent polls in producing his final estimates. Whatever the reason, in both cases that under-
prediction had a significant impact on their ability to forecast correctly which party would win in a 
substantial number of marginal constituencies.16 
                                                          
15 The correlations across the three sets of probabilities are fairly low, accounting for only between 68 and 75 
per cent of the variation; each analyst’s procedure produced quite different estimates. 
16 It is of interest to note that although the exit poll conducted for BBC/ITV News/Sky News was extremely 
accurate in its prediction of the national share of the seats (based on an estimate of the national vote share 
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Such deficiencies are far from insuperable and could be readily overcome by changes to the 
procedures, which could be tested with the data obtained for 2017 – by different weighting of the 
polling data obtained close to the election date, for example – prior to applications at the next 
general election. Other changes are possible, such as over-sampling in marginal constituencies, and 
will undoubtedly be considered in preparations for that next general election – at which other 
pollsters and analysts may well also offer constituency-level predictions. Undoubtedly, the results of 
these 2017 experiments will be assessed favourably by those involved; although their predictions 
were not all correct, their methods – to a greater or lesser extent – indicate that producing accurate 
estimates of the likely outcome in each constituency is a promising enterprise, and one that would 
not be very expensive, given its reliance on available data plus contemporary polls that would be 
conducted in any case.17 Of course, just because the MRP forecasting method has proved relatively 
successful in this instance does not necessarily mean that it will work well in future contests; only 
time will tell. 
 
One issue not addressed here – in large part because of the absence of the needed data – is whether 
the method can pick up short-term trends. The predictions analysed here were those published at 
the end of the campaign – by the two analysts who were regularly updating their databases. They 
are of interest for analyses after the event, but of greater interest are the data produced during the 
campaign. If they can identify those constituencies, especially marginal ones, that are deviating from 
the national trends in the weeks before polling day, they could be of very great value to the parties 
and their candidates, and also to local voters. 
 
Constituency-level predictions produced by MRP-based methodologies, and perhaps by others too, 
are likely to be more sophisticated and accurate in the future (something that can be established to 
a considerable extent by reworking the data obtained in 2017). Parties, local and national, will find 
them of immense value, as also will the media – and local campaigns, plus the national contributions 
to them, will be influenced accordingly. One associated problem, however, will be transmitting 
estimates that have confidence intervals associated with them. The tradition has developed with 
British polling and its media reportage that all percentages reported – Labour’s likely share of the 
vote total, for example – have a plus-or-minus three percentage points error. This figure was 
developed when polls were based on nationally representative samples of electors and was in any 
case no more than a simple rule of thumb then. With non-representative, non-probability samples 
being the basis for most contemporary polls, it is totally irrelevant – as shown by the very different 
error bands on the YouGov website estimates of constituency vote shares.18 Of course, with 
Bayesian modelling those credible intervals – usually termed error bands or confidence intervals – 
may be asymmetrical around the estimated value. Thus, the main disadvantage of MRP—and in fact, 
nearly all UK polling—is over-reliance on non-probability samples, which means that knowing 
whether the demographic profiles from these data are predictive of their respective subgroup is 
impossible prior to the event. In short, MRP is a powerful tool, but it is not a panacea. 
 
The downside of the impact of this additional information could well be that it further skews the 
geography of election campaigning in Great Britain. As parties have become increasingly focused on 
                                                          
that was not published) it too predicted the wrong winner in a number of constituencies. (We are grateful to 
Colin Rallings for giving us access to those probabilities.) 
17 Most pollsters have a standard set of questions asked every time they are in the field, with additional 
questions to address particular issues, perhaps at their customers’ request. Those standard questions, for 
which they assemble a large number of answers over an election campaign, are the basis for the exercises 
discussed here. 
18 This point was strongly made by Michael Thrasher in oral evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Political Polling and Digital Media on 31 October 2017. 
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their target marginal constituencies, so large swathes of the country and very significant segments of 
the electorate find that they are virtually ignored during campaigns. They may get a copy of each 
candidate’s election leaflet (though large numbers report that they do not), but their support will 
not be canvassed in any other way and there may be little public evidence that an election is taking 
place – few, if any, posters, for example. Increasingly activity will concentrate on voters in the 
marginal seats, especially those where the polls suggest there is a shift in voter preferences that a 
party will want to capitalise on. Voters elsewhere will still be subject to the national campaigning 
through the media, but they will be excluded from anything else – not disenfranchisement but 
disregard. 
 
The evidence from the 2017 exercises suggests that constituency-level predictions of party vote 
shares and likely winners will move to the centre of campaigning activity. Some local parties and 
their candidates have for some time been campaigning on the message that ‘only we can defeat 
party x here’, (party x being the incumbent), but usually without very convincing evidence to sustain 
their cause: now they can have it – and will want it. Just as internet polling came to dominate 
elections in the provision of evidence for campaigns in the first two 21st century decades, so 
constituency estimates will come to the fore in the 2020s. Desirable or not, parties and the 
electorate will have to accommodate them: the tide cannot be turned. And if they become more 
accurate than in this first exercise, and can accurately predict trends as they emerge, their influence 
will be profound. 
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Table 1. Vote share and seats won at the 2017 and 2015 UK General Elections in Great Britain 
 
 Vote Share (%) Seats Won Vote Share (%) Seats Won 
 2017  2015 
Conservative Party 43.5 317 37.8 330 
Labour Party 41.0 262 31.2 232 
Liberal Democrat Party 7.6 12 8.1 8 
UK Independence Party 1.9 0 12.9 1  
Scottish National Party 3.1 35 4.9 56 
Plaid Cymru 0.5 4 0.6 3 
Green Party 1.7 1 3.8 1 
Total 99.3 631 99.3 631 
 
Notes: Results from the constituency contested by the Speaker of the House have been excluded. 
Data from the British Election Study Constituency Results file v1.0. 
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Table 2. Regressions of the 2017 vote share for each party against its 2015 share at the constituency 
scale. 
 
 a  b2015 r2  
England and Wales 
Conservative 7.65 (0.63) +   0.94 (0.02) 0.87 
Labour 9.49 (0.37) + 1.02 (0.01) 0.95 
Liberal Democrat -0.52 (0.21) + 0.99 (0.02) 0.82 
Scotland 
Conservative 11.09 (1.27) + 1.15 (0.08) 0.80 
Labour 3.86 (1.44) + 0.97 (0.06) 0.85 
Liberal Democrat 0.85 (0.74) + 0.80 (0.05) 0.80 
SNP 8.13 (2.37) + 0.58 (0.05) 0.73 
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Table 3. Regressions of each party’s constituency vote share at the 2017 general election in England 
and Wales against the predictions of the three analysts. 
 
 a  b2015 r2  
Conservative 
 YouGov -4.05 (0.52) + 1.16 (0.01) 0.94 
 Ashcroft -5.49 (0.48) + 1.09 (0.10) 0.95 
 Hanretty 2.27 (0.82) + 0.93 (0.02) 0.83 
Labour 
 YouGov -4.80 (0.44) + 1.17 (0.01) 0.96 
 Ashcroft -2.94 (0.48) + 1.22 (0.01) 0.95 
 Hanretty 1.73 (0.51) + 1.20 (0.01) 0.93 
Liberal Democrat 
 YouGov -1.53 (0.12) + 1.01 (0.01) 0.95 
 Ashcroft -3.91 (0.21) + 1.31 (0.20) 0.88 
 Hanretty -2.46 (0.23) + 1.14 (0.02) 0.84 
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Table 4. Regressions of each party’s constituency vote share at the 2017 general election in Scotland 
against the predictions of the three analysts. 
 
 a  b2015 r2  
Conservative 
 YouGov -3.17 (3.16) + 1.17 (0.05) 0.91 
 Ashcroft -2.29 (1.59) + 1.12 (0.06) 0.87 
 Hanretty -3.06 (1.83) + 1.25 (0.07) 0.84 
Labour 
 YouGov -6.14 (1.34) + 1.36 (0.05) 0.92 
 Ashcroft -2.90 (1.51) + 1.35 (0.06) 0.89 
 Hanretty -4.02 (1.67) + 1.26 (0.06) 0.87 
Liberal Democrat 
 YouGov -0.90 (0.35) + 1.04 (0.03) 0.96 
 Ashcroft -3.86 (0.73) + 1.44 (0.07) 0.87 
 Hanretty 0.03 (0.65) + 1.04 (0.06) 0.85 
SNP 
 YouGov 5.84 (2.92) + 0.81 (0.07) 0.66 
 Ashcroft 4.78 (2.73) + 0.77 (0.06) 0.71 
 Hanretty 8.93 (2.89) + 0.67 (0.07) 0.63 
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Table 5. The predicted and actual number of seats won by each party, for each of the three 
analysts 
 
Predicted/Actual C L LD SNP PC G Σ  
YouGov 
Conservative 294 5 4 1 0 0 304 
Labour 17 251 0 0 1 0 269 
Liberal Democrat 0 0 7 0 1 0 8 
SNP 6 6 1 34 0 0 47 
PC 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Green 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Σ 317 262 12 35 4 1 631 
Ashcroft 
Predicted/Actual C L LD SNP PC G Σ 
Conservative 307 40 7 1 0 0 355 
Labour 2 212 0 0 2 1 217 
Liberal Democrat 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
SNP 7 6 4 34 0 0 51 
PC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Green 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tie 1 4 0 0 1 0 6 
Σ 317 262 12 35 4 1 631 
Hanretty 
Predicted/Actual C L LD SNP PC G Σ  
Conservative 303 55 8 1 0 0 367 
Labour 5 199 0 0 0 1 205 
Liberal Democrat 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
SNP 8 6 3 34 0 0 51 
PC 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Green 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tie 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Σ 317 262 12 35 4 1 631 
 
Key to parties: C – Conservative; L – Labour; LD – Liberal Democrat; SNP – Scottish National Party; PC 
– Plaid Cymru; G – Green.  
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Table 6. Seats won (W) and lost (L) according to the estimated probabilities of a party 
winning there by the three analysts 
 
 Conservative Labour  LD  SNP  PC 
Probability W L W L W L W L W L  
YouGov 
100 193 0 173 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 
90-99 55 0 48 4 4 0 23 5 0 0 
75-89 24 0 15 4 2 1 4 5 1 0 
50-74 20 11 15 11 0 0 2 3 1 0 
40-49 6 4 5 4 1 3 1 0 0 0 
<39 19 300 6 347 4 616 0 11 2 36 
Ashcroft 
100 130 0 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90-99 132 4 81 0 0 0 24 2 0 0 
75-89 29 13 32 1 0 0 7 5 0 0 
50-74 16 31 48 3 1 0 3 10 0 0 
40-49 6 17 19 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 
<39 4 250 27 365 10 619 0 5 4 36 
Hanretty 
100 241 2 116 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
90-99 46 27 41 0 1 1 20 4 1 0 
75-89 9 17 19 4 0 0 9 7 1 0 
50-74 8 18 24 1 1 0 3 6 1 0 
40-49 1 8 6 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 
<39 12 243 56 364 10 616 0 4 1 36 
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Figure 1. Regressions of the Conservative and Labour constituency vote shares in 2017 in England 
and Wales against their shares in 2015 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Regression of the SNP’s constituency vote shares in 2017 in Scotland against its shares in 
2015 
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Figure 3. Regressions of the Conservative and Labour parties’ constituency vote shares in England 
and Wales in 2017 against each analyst’s predictions of those shares. 
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Figure 4. The three analysts’ predictions of the outcome and the actual outcome in the 
Conservative-Labour marginal constituencies at the 2017 election in England and Wales 
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Figure 5. The three analysts’ predictions of the outcome and the actual outcome in Scotland’s 59 
constituencies at the 2017 election 
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Figure 6. The predicted probabilities of a party winning a seat in 2017 in England and Wales by its 
predicted vote share in 2017, showing the actual winner of each seat: YouGov’s predicted 
probabilities of Labour victories and Ashcroft’s predicted probabilities of Conservative victories. 
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Figure 7. Each analyst’s predicted probabilities of Labour winning in 2017 in each of the 
Conservative-Labour marginal constituencies, showing the actual winner 
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Figure 8. Each analyst’s predicted probabilities of the SNP winning in 2017 in each of Scotland’s 59 
constituencies, showing the actual winner 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
